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ABSTRACT 
 
This article begins by setting out the human rights provisions that apply to social 
media expression. It then provides insight into the part social media plays within our 
society by analysing the social media landscape, and how it facilitates a ‘purer’ form 
of expression. The social media paradox is explored through the lens of current 
societal issues and concerns regarding the use of social media and how these have 
manifested into litigation. It concludes by analysing the tension that the application 
of an array of criminal legislation and jurisprudence has created with freedom of 
expression, and whether this can successfully mitigated by the Director of Public 
Prosecution’s Interim Guidelines. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The media landscape is undergoing profound change, on an unprecedented scale and 
at an exponential pace, at the forefront of which, is social media. This 
communication revolution has been recognised within a variety of international 
arenas. For instance, in 2011, the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee 
(HRC) stated: 
 
‘[I]nternet and mobile based electronic information dissemination systems, have 
substantially changed communication practices around the world. There is now a 
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global network for exchanging ideas and opinions that does not necessarily rely on 
the traditional mass media intermediaries.’1 
 
On UN World Press Day in 2012, Abdulaziz Al-Nasser, President of the UN General 
Assembly, said: “Governments that try to suppress or shut-down new media 
platforms should rather embrace new media for the beneficial transformation of 
their societies.”2 Further, in early 2014, the House of Lords Select Committee on 
Communications Report on Media Plurality recognised the increasingly important 
role that new media is playing within society3. These views have been mirrored in the 
USA, where the influence of social media was summed up by the Criminal Court of 
the City of New York in New York v Harris: “The reality of today’s world is that 
social media, whether it be Twitter, Facebook, Pinterest, Google+ or any other site, 
is the way people communicate”4.  
 
Social media is both dynamic and organic. Platforms that have come to be 
synonymous with the terms ‘social media’ and ‘social networking’, such as Facebook 
and Twitter, are constantly evolving to meet, not only the needs and wants of their 
users, and the objectives of their owners, but also to compete against other, emerging 
platforms, and to continue to develop within the technological and economical 
infrastructures they inhabit5.  
 
Due to its structural fluidity, social media has been defined in a number of ways. For 
instance, it has been said that it is: “a group of Internet-based applications that 
build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow 
the creation and exchange of User Generated Content.”6 It has also been described 
                                                            
*Lecturer in Law, Aston University; Barrister, East Anglian Chambers; p.coe@aston.ac.uk 
1 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 34: Freedoms of opinion and expression, 
CCPR/C/GC/34 (GC 34) 12th September 2011, [15]; See also, O’Flaherty, Freedom of Expression: 
Article 19 of the ICCPR and Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No 34, (2012) 12 Human 
Rights Law Review 627 
2 UN Highlights Role of Press Freedom as Catalyst for Social and Political Change, UN News Centre, 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41911&Cr=journalist&Cr1 accessed 28th April 2014 
3 House of Lords Select Committee on Communications 1st Report of Session 2013-14, Media Plurality, 
4th February 2014, [46]-[52] 
4 New York v Harris, 2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1871 *3, note 3 (Crim. Ct. City of N.Y., N.Y. County, 
2012) 
5 J. Van Dijck, The Culture of Connectivity A Critical History of Social Media, (Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 7 
6 A.M. Kaplan and M Haenlein, Users of the world, unite! The challenges and opportunities of Social 
Media, Business Horizons (2010) 53, 59—68, 61 
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as: “web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-
public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with 
whom they share a connection, and (3) view and transverse their list of connections 
and those made by others within the system.”7 These definitions recognise social 
media as a tool that has changed the way in which we communicate, giving rise to a 
culture of sharing and voluntariness8. According to Professor Van Dijck social media 
has created a new: “online layer through which people organise their lives…this 
layer of platforms influences human interaction on an individual and community 
level, as well as on a larger societal level, while the worlds of online and offline are 
increasingly interpenetrating.”9 
 
This article will begin by setting out the human rights provisions that apply to social 
media expression. It will then consider the social media landscape and how it 
facilitates a ‘purer’ form of expression. Current issues and concerns regarding the use 
of social media are explored to set the scene and provide context for the final section, 
which looks at how some of these issues have translated into criminal litigation and 
how the law has coped with social media expression to date. 
 
II. HUMAN RIGHTS: THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
 
The principles and accepted norms relating to the operation of social media 
expression, pursuant to human rights treaties and jurisprudence, predominantly 
emanate from an era that could not have envisaged the social media revolution. 
Despite this, expression, via social media platforms, is subject to these various 
provisions. This section sets out the relevant framework under both the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 
 
 
 
                                                            
7 D.M. Boyd and N.B. Ellison (2007), Social Network Sites: Definition, History and Scholarship, 
Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 13: 210–230, 211 
8 D.R. Stewart (ed), Social Media and the Law, (Routledge, 2013), viii; See also, C. Shirky, Here 
Comes Everybody, (Allen Lane, 2008), 17 
9 Van Dijck (n 5), 4 
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(i)International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)  
 
Article 19(2) of the ICCPR, to which the UK is a signatory, states: 
 
‘Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless 
of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any 
other media of his choice’. 
 
According to the UN Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur’s Report on the 
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, this 
provision applies to the internet10, as it has become a means by which individuals can 
facilitate their right to freedom of opinion and expression. It provides access to 
information that was previously unobtainable, and therefore contributes to the 
discovery of truth and the progress of society11.  In addition to the internet generally, 
the Report states that Article 19(2) was drafted with foresight to cover advances in 
technology through which expression can be made12. The HRC has suggested that 
methods of expression include: ‘all forms of electronic and internet-based modes of 
expression’13. Thus, clearly, in the eyes of the HRC, this renders the provision 
relevant and applicable to new and emerging communication technology, such as 
social media platforms.  
 
The HRC has also recognised that certain forms of expression can be subject to 
restriction14. To ensure the legitimacy of any such restriction on freedom of 
expression, the regulatory/legislative framework and/or jurisprudential reasoning in 
question must fall within the parameters of Article 19(3)15. These frameworks must 
                                                            
10 F. La Rue, Report of the Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, A/HRC/17/27, 16th May 2011, 
 [21]; See also, UN General Assembly Human Rights Council, The promotion, protection and 
enjoyment of human rights on the Internet, Resolution 20/8, A/HRC/RES/20/8, 29th June 2012, [1]  
11 Ibid. [19] 
12 La Rue (n 10), [21] 
13 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 34: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, 
CCPR/C/GC/34 (GC 34) 12th September 2011, [12] 
14 Ibid, [11]; See also, F. La Rue, Report of the Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur (n 10), 
[25] 
15 La Rue (n 10), [23]-[24]; See also, UN Human Rights Council, Promotion and protection of all 
human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to 
development, Fourteenth Session, A/HRC/14/23, 20th April 2010, [72]-[87] 
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provide for the differences between the print, broadcast and internet media sectors, 
whilst also taking into account their convergence16. Any restrictions that are imposed 
on the operation of internet based search providers or communication platforms, 
including social media, must fall within the parameters of Article 19(3), which 
provides: 
 
‘The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article carries with it 
special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain 
restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: 
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of 
national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals’. 
 
Although, in Ross v Canada17, Article 19(2) was held to encapsulate expression that 
may be deemed deeply offensive18, the HRC has stated that such expression, in 
different circumstances, could give rise to legitimate restriction pursuant to 19(3)19. 
Other forms of expression that can be subject to permissible restriction under the 
provision include, inter alia: hate speech20; defamation; advocacy of national, racial 
or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or 
violence21.  
 
(ii)European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
 
Article 10(1) ECHR provides:  
 
‘Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference 
by public authority and regardless of frontiers’.  
 
                                                            
16 UN Human Rights Committee (n 13), [34] 
17 18 October 2000, Communication No. 736/1997 
18 See also: UN Human Rights Committee (n 13), [34] 
19 Ibid.  However, these ‘different circumstances’ have not been specified. 
20 See: Faurisson v. France, UN Human Rights Committee, communication 550/1993, views of 8th 
November 1996.  
21 La Rue (n 10), [25] 
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Article 10(1) is qualified by Article 10(2), which states:  
 
‘The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, 
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of 
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received 
in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary’. 
 
The jurisprudence of the ECtHR, as stated in Handyside v United Kingdom22, is very 
similar to that of the HRC23, as it determines that freedom of expression includes the 
right to say things or express opinions “that offend, shock or disturb the state or any 
sector of the population”24.  
 
In order to determine whether particular expression has been subject to legitimate 
restriction within the confines of 10(2) the ECtHR, and domestic courts, have 
attributed a hierarchical value25 to different types of expression.  
 
According to ECtHR jurisprudence, political expression affords the strongest 
protection26. This view has been mirrored by the House of Lords 27. For instance, in 
Campbell v MGN28, Baroness Hale stated: 
 
                                                            
22 A 24 (1976); 1 EHRR 737 
23 18 October 2000, Communication No. 736/1997; UN Human Rights Committee (n 13), [34] 
24 Handyside (n 22), [49]; See also, Éditions Plon v. France App. No 58184/00 ECHR 2004-IV, [42]-
[43] 
25 The high/low level speech terminology was developed in the USA through scholarship on the First 
Amendment. See J. Rowbottom, To rant, vent and converse: protecting low level digital speech, 
C.L.J. 2012, 71(2), 355-383, 368 citing C. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (New 
York: 1993), 122-123. See generally: L. Scaife, The DPP and social media: a new approach coming out 
of the Woods? Comms. L. (2013), 18(1), 5-10, 8 
26 TV Vest As & Rogaland Pensjonistparti v Norway [2008] ECHR 21132/05, [59]; Lingens v Austria 
(1986) 8 E.H.R.R. 407, [42]; Wingrove v United Kingdom (1997) 24 E.H.R.R. 1, [58]; United 
Communist Party of Turkey v Turkey (1998) 26 E.H.R.R. 121, [45]; Nilsen v Norway (2000) 30 
E.H.R.R. 878, [46]; Vgt Verein gegen Tierfabriken (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 4, [66]; Murphy v Ireland 
(2004) 38 E.H.R.R. 13, [67] 
27 See: R (ProLife Alliance) v BBC [2003] UKHL 23, [6] per Lord Nicholls; R v Shayler [2002] UKHL 
11, [21] per Lord Bingham. 
28 [2004] UKHL 22 
7 
 
“The free exchange of information and ideas on matters relevant to the 
organisation of the economic, social and political life of the country is crucial to any 
democracy. Without this it can scarcely be called a democracy at all”29. 
 
Within the value hierarchy political expression is followed, first, by artistic 
expression30, and then by commercial expression31, both of which attract 
intermediate protection32. Under this comes celebrity gossip33, then pornography34. 
Finally, at the very bottom of the hierarchy, and attracting little, if any protection, are 
gratuitous personal attacks35 and hate speech36.  
 
In Fuentes Bobo v Spain37 the ECtHR determined that, in deciding whether 
particular expression is of high or low value, it would have regard to whether the 
author had the opportunity to prepare what was expressed and whether there has 
been a “possibility of reformulating, perfecting or retracting”38 the content of the 
expression before it is made available to the public39. This is particularly relevant in 
the context of social media as platforms for user speech, as discussed in the following 
section. 
 
Pursuant to section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), it is unlawful for 
prosecutors and judges to act incompatibly with ECHR rights. Further, section 3 of 
the HRA requires judges to interpret legislation compatibly with ECHR rights, if it is 
possible to do so.  In addition, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the HRC is clear: 
there is a right to expression that is offensive, shocking or disturbing40. Thus, as dealt 
                                                            
29 Ibid. [148] 
30 Muller v Switzerland (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 212; Otto Preminger v Austria (1995) 19 E.H.R.R. 34; IA v 
Turkey (2007) E.H.R.R. 30 
31 Markt Intern v Germany (1989) 12 E.H.R.R. 161, [33] 
32 Rowbottom (n 25), 368 
33 Campbell (n 28), [149] 
34 Belfast City Council v Miss Behavin’ Ltd [2007] UKHL 19, [38] 
35 Gorelishvili v Georgia (2009) 48 E.H.R.R. 36, [40] 
36 Lehideux and Isornia v France (1998) 5 B.H.R.C. 540, [53]; Norwood v United Kingdom (2004) 40 
E.H.R.R. SE 111 
37 (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 50 
38 Ibid. [46] 
39 See generally: L. Scaife, The DPP and social media: a new approach coming out of the Woods? 
Comms. L. (2013), 18(1), 5-10 
40 Handyside (n 22); EHRR 737 [49]; Ross v Canada 18 October 2000, Communication No. 
736/1997; UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 34: Freedoms of Opinion and 
Expression, CCPR/C/GC/34 (GC 34) 12th September 2011, [11] 
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with in section 5, the potential for social media activity to conflict with freedom of 
expression is most obvious when expression is criminalised41. 
 
III. THE (SOCIAL) MEDIA LANDSCAPE: PLATFORMS FOR A ‘PURER’ FORM OF 
EXPRESSION? 
The origins of the traditional media, and in particular the press industry, may well be 
founded on freedom of expression philosophy42, and the notion that, as ‘the fourth 
estate’, its primary function is to act as a ‘public watchdog’,43 in that it operates as the 
general public’s “eyes and ears” by investigating and reporting abuses of power44. 
However, it is submitted that media ownership, and the power derived from it, 
means that there is a constant conflict between these underpinnings and commercial 
reality. Consequently, until relatively recently, the public were, to a greater extent, 
limited as to what they were exposed to reading or seeing, by what large proportions 
of the traditional media chose to publish or broadcast. Such decisions may have 
come down to editorial control, based on, for instance, owner or political bias, 
commercial revenue, or both.  
Social media platforms have changed this media landscape forever, as they have 
altered our perceptions of the limits of communication, and reception of information. 
It is no longer the case that communication is constrained by boundaries, such as 
location, time, space or culture45. The gradual erosion of these boundaries is borne 
out by recent Office for National Statistics data, which states that, in 2013, 83% of 
Great British households had internet access. Thirty-six million (73%) adults in Great 
                                                            
41 D. McGoldrick, The Limits of Freedom of Expression on Facebook and Social Networking Sites: A 
UK Perspective, HRLR 13 (2013), 125-151, 131 citing A. Bailin, Criminalising Free Speech? (2011) 
Criminal Law Review, 9, 705-711 
42 For detailed discussion on freedom of expression philosophy see, for instance: E. Barendt, Freedom 
of Speech, (2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2005); F. Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry, 
(Cambridge University Press, 1982); L. Alexander, Is there a Right to Freedom of Expression, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2005); T. Campbell and W. Sadurski, Freedom of Communication, 
(Dartmouth, 1994); J.M. Bakin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society (2004) 79 New York U LR 1 
43 Observer and Guardian v UK (1992) 14 EHRR 153, [59] 
44 A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No. 2) [1990] 1 AC 109, 183 per Sir John Donaldson MR; See 
also: Barendt (n 42), 418 
45 See generally: F. Webster, Theories of the Information Society, (4th edn, Routledge, 2014), 20; I. 
Barron and R. Curnow, The Future with Microelectronics: Forecasting the Effects of Information 
Technology, (Pinter, 1979); G. Mulgan, Communication and Control: Networks and the New 
Economies of Communication, (Polity, 1991) 
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Britain used the internet every day, equating to twenty million more than in 2006; 
with 53% using a mobile phone to access it remotely, more than double 2010’s figure 
of 24%46. These figures are reflected by recent statistics from the USA and the EU. As 
of May 2013, 80% of American adults had either a broadband connection at home, or 
a smartphone, or both47. In 2012, the percentage of individuals in the EU who used 
the internet was 73%, 30% of which gained access via mobile devices away from 
home or work48. Worldwide, the estimated number of internet users exceeds two 
billion49.  
 
Our access to multiple social media outlets and platforms twenty-four hours a day 
that, due to mobile phones, tablets and laptops, can be accessed instantaneously, 
regardless of location or time, is symptomatic of how new media has evolved to take 
full advantage of this transcendence of traditional boundaries. Thus, users, forming 
what Benkler refers to as the “networked public sphere”50, can transmit and receive 
information to one and other, via platforms, such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, 
WhatsApp and Snapchat, without the need to consider, what have become, the 
arbitrary boundaries mentioned above. When in place, these boundaries acted as a 
natural filtration system for news and information. Their dilution has enabled real-
time relationships to exist without any physical interaction51. Consequently, 
Professor McLuhan’s proclamation, that the “medium is the message”52, seems both 
prophetic and entirely apt for the social media era as, according to McLuhan, the 
                                                            
46 Indeed, if you add “portable computers” to this, the percentage of people accessing the internet ‘on 
the go’ in 2013 rises to 61%: Office for National Statistics, Internet Access – Households and 
Individuals, 2013, 8th August 2013 http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_322713.pdf accessed 27th 
March 2014 
47 The 80% breaks down as follows: 46% have both home broadband connection and a smartphone; 
24% have home broadband connection but no smartphone; 10% have a smartphone, but not home 
broadband connection: K. Zickurh and A. Smith, Home Broadband 2013, PewResearch Internet 
Project, 26th August 2013  http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/08/26/home-broadband-2013/; A. 
Smith, Smartphone Ownership 2013, PewResearch Internet Project, 5th June 2013, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/06/05/smartphone-ownership-2013/ both accessed 27th March 
2014 
48 H. Seybert, Internet use in households and by individuals in 2012, Eurostat, 2012 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-12-050/EN/KS-SF-12-050-EN.PDF 
accessed 27th March 2014 
49 La Rue, Report of the Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur (n 10), [21]; See also, UN 
General Assembly Human Rights Council, The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights 
on the Internet, Resolution 20/8, A/HRC/RES/20/8, 29th June 2012, [2] 
50 Y. Benkler, The Wealth of Networks (Yale University Press, 2006), 212 
51 B. Wellman, Physical Space and Cyberspace: The Rise of Personalised Networking, International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research 25(2), 227-51 
52 M. McLuhan, Understanding Media The Extensions of Man (MIT Press, 1964), 7 
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media is an extension of ourselves, and new mediums introduced into our lives give 
rise to personal and social consequences, as a result of that new ‘extension’53. 
Accordingly: “the message of any medium or technology is the change of scale or 
pace or pattern that it introduces into human affairs” 54.  
 
The way in which the media envelopes our existence is amplified by social media. 
Platforms such as Facebook and Twitter have become an embodiment of McLuhan’s 
‘extension of man’, and a facilitator of unfiltered expression, by being platforms for 
user speech, as opposed to that of a media organisation’s ownership, employees or 
political stance. Traditional media organisations simply no longer monopolise the 
methods we use to find and facilitate news-gathering, communication or reception, 
or indeed how we express opinions and ideas. For instance, the death of Osama Bin 
Laden was leaked on Twitter, before being published by any newspaper55. Edward 
Snowden disclosed information regarding American surveillance programmes to 
blogger Glenn Greenwald, as he did not trust the New York Times to publish the 
material56. Syria’s President, Bashar al-Assad, and his opposing rebels distribute 
competing propaganda via Instagram57. Chelsea Manning, the US soldier convicted 
in 2013 for, inter alia, offences pursuant to the Espionage Act, leaked classified 
documents to WikiLeaks, as opposed to a ‘traditional’ media outlet58. 
 
Thus, never before has a form of media changed the ‘scale, pace or pattern’ of human 
affairs to such an extent, within such a short period of time.59 These platforms are 
                                                            
53 Ibid.  
54 McLuhan (n 52), 8 
55 B. Shelter, How the Bin Laden Announcement Leaked Out, New York Times, 1st May 2011, 
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/01/how-the-osama-announcement-leaked-
out/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 accessed 12th September 2014 
56 M. Ammori, The “new” New York Times: Free speech lawyering in the age of Google and Twitter, 
Harvard Law Review, 2014, vol. 127: 2259-2295, 2265 
57 N. Gaouette, Assad on Instagram Vies with Rebel Videos to Seek Support, Bloomberg, 19th 
September 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-19/assad-on-instagram-vies-with-rebel-
videos-to-seek-support.html accessed 12th September 2014 
58 Benkler (n 50), 348 
59 Consequently, Time magazine named ‘You’ the person of the year in 2006: “for seizing the reins of 
the global media, for founding and framing the new digital democracy, for working for nothing and 
beating the pros at their own game.” See: L. Grossman, You-Yes, You- Are TIME’S Person of the 
Year, Time, 25th December 2006, 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1570810,00.html accessed 18th September 
2014 
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used as a way of, not only receiving news60, but of instantaneously, and often 
spontaneously, without filter, expressing opinions and venting and sharing emotions, 
thoughts and feelings,61 circumventing the mass media, and giving rise to a 
convergence of audience and producer62. This is illustrated by using statistics to 
compare the use of new, and in particular social, media with traditional media. For 
example, the New York Times 2013 print and digital circulation was approximately 
two million63, enabling it to proclaim that it was the “#1 individual newspaper site” 
on the internet, with nearly thirty-one million unique visitors per month64. In 
contrast, YouTube, which is owned by Google, has one billion unique visitors per 
month65 which, according to Marvin Ammori, equates to: “thirty times more than 
the New York Times, or as many unique visitors in a day as the [New York] Times 
has every month”66. Incidentally, Google’s search engine reached a billion monthly 
users in 201167. According to WordPress’ statistics, it hosts blogs written in over 120 
languages, equating to over 409 million users viewing more than 15.8 billion pages 
each month. Consequently, users produce approximately 43.7 million new posts and 
58.8 million new comments on a monthly basis. These users can choose to create and 
maintain anonymous blogs. Moreover, companies such as CNN, UPS and NBC 
Sports use the facility to manage their sites68. Twitter states that it normally ‘takes in’ 
approximately 500 million Tweets per day, equating to an average of 5,700 Tweets 
per second69. It has more visitors per week than the New York Times does in a 
month70. Similarly, Tumblr hosts over 170 million microblogs71 and, with 300 million 
                                                            
60 According to Ofcom’s report, The Communications Market 2013 (at para. 1.9.7), 23% of people use 
social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, for news: 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/cmr/cmr13/UK_1.pdf accessed 19th March 2014 
61 Indeed, in April 2014 Facebook emailed its users to inform them that the messages function is 
moving out of the Facebook application due to their Messenger application enabling users to reply 
20% faster than using Facebook.  
62 See generally: Rowbottom (n 25), 365 
63 C. Haughney, Newspapers Post Gains in Digital Circulation, New York Times, 30th April 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/business/media/digital-subscribers-buoy-newspaper-
circulation.html accessed 12th September 2014 
64 New York Times Media Kit, http://perma.cc/B5KA-VMGC accessed 12th September 2014 
65 Statistics YouTube, http://perma.cc/S8W5-ZRM4, accessed 12th September 2014 
66 Ammori (n 56), 2266 
67 Ibid. 
68 http://en.wordpress.com/stats/ accessed 22nd September 2014 
69 https://blog.twitter.com/2013/new-tweets-per-second-record-and-how accessed  14th March 2014 
70 Ammori (n 56) 
71 Ibid. 2272 
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visits per month, enjoys ten times more than the New York Times72. According to 
Facebook, as of 31st December 2013, it had 1.23 billion monthly active users, 945 
million of which use their mobile applications73. Late 2013 saw Instagram’s global 
usage expand by 15%, in just two months, to 150 million people74. LinkedIn’s current 
membership is 277 million75. These established platforms are only the ‘tip of the new 
media iceberg’. Pinterest continues to grow rapidly76, as do emerging platforms, such 
as Snapchat and WhatsApp77. Consequently, for many people, social media platforms 
have not just replaced the written word; they have become a substitute for the 
spoken word. 
 
IV. ISSUES AND CONCERNS REGARDING THE USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA: 
SETTING THE ‘SOCIAL MEDIA PARADOX’ SCENE 
 
It is clear that social media, as an extension of man, can liberate and empower 
individuals, regardless of social status78. It has borne millions of ‘publishers’ who are 
able to circumvent the traditional mass media. On the one hand, it is arguable that 
this can only be good for freedom of expression and, incidentally, freedom of 
thought. These ‘publishers’ are not subject to the filter system discussed above and, 
for instance, political bias, censorship, the influence of media ownership or editorial 
control. In many ways social media facilitates freedom of expression in its purest 
form.  
 
On the other hand, however, this power can intoxicate individuals, who are perhaps 
not prepared for the responsibility that comes with its use, and leads them to 
                                                            
72 J. Yarow, The Truth About Tumblr: Its Numbers Are Significantly Worse than You Think, Business 
Insider, 21st May 2013 http://www.businessinsider.com/tumblrs-active-users-lighter-than-expected-
2013-5 accessed 12th September 2014 
73 https://newsroom.fb.com/key-Facts  accessed 14th March 2014 
74 http://instagram.com/press/#; UK Social Media Statistics for 2014, 
http://socialmediatoday.com/kate-rose-mcgrory/2040906/uk-social-media-statistics-2014, accessed 
12th March 2014 
75 http://press.linkedin.com/about  accessed 14th March 2014 
76 In 2011/2012 Pinterest had approximately 200,000 users in the UK. In the summer of 2013 this had 
grown to over 2 million: http://socialmediatoday.com/kate-rose-mcgrory/2040906/uk-social-media-
statistics-2014, accessed 12th March 2014 
77 Ibid.  
78 McGoldrick (n 41), 130; See also: Twitter’s fightback against depression, GQ Magazine, May 2014, 
226. This article considers how the former professional footballer, Stan Collymore, used Twitter to 
document his depression to raise awareness of mental illness to help other sufferers; P. Bernal, A 
defence of responsible tweeting, Comms. L. (2014), 19(1), 12-19, 14-15.  
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communicate as though they operate within a “‘Wild West’, law free zone in 
Cyberspace”79. According to McGoldrick, this has led to “catastrophic 
consequences”80. For example, individuals in the UK, and elsewhere, have been 
convicted of criminal offences81, investigated by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation82, sued for defamation83, and have been subject to disciplinary 
proceedings, and in some cases, dismissal by their employer84. Thus, a consequence 
of the ubiquity and diversity of these platforms, and the way in which they have 
ingrained themselves within our social cultural fabric, is that habits, conventions and 
social norms, that were once informal and transitory manifestations of social life, are 
now infused within social media platforms. What were casual and ephemeral actions 
and/or acts of expression, such as conversing with friends or colleagues or 
swapping/displaying pictures, or exchanging thoughts that were once kept private or 
                                                            
79 A. Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal Society? Metaphors and Perceptions of Cyberspace, (2002) 17 
Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1207; See also G. Benaim, A future with social media: Wild West or 
Utopia? You have a stake in the outcome, http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/05/14/a-future-with-
social-media-wild-west-or-utopia-you-have-a-stake-in-the-outcome-gideon-benaim/ accessed 16th 
May 2014 
80 McGoldrick (n 41), 130-131 
81 For example, see R v Blackshaw [2011] EWCA Crim 2312 
82 A 14-year-old Dutch girl was arrested by police in Rotterdam following a tweet made on 13th April 
2014 to American Airlines, stating: “@AmericanAir hello my name’s Ibrahim and I’m from 
Afghanistan. I’m part of Al Qaida and on June 1st I’m gonna do something really big bye”. Following 
her arrest American Airlines confirmed that it would pass on the girl’s IP address to the FBI for 
investigation: See, A. Withnall, Twitter’s American Airlines ‘terror threat’ 14-year-old girl arrested 
by police in Rotterdam, The Independent, 14th April 2014 http://www.independent.co.uk/life-
style/gadgets-and-tech/twitters-american-airlines-terror-threat-14yearold-girl-arrested-by-police-in-
rotterdam-9259485.html; J. McCully, Terror on Twitter, 
http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/04/29/terror-on-twitter-jonathan-mccully/#more-26428 both 
accessed 30th April 2014 
83 For example, see: Applause Store Productions Ltd v Raphael [2008] EWHC 1781; [2008] Info TLR 
318; Cairns v Modi [2012] EWHC 756 (QB); [2012] EWCA Civ 1382; Tilbrook v Parr [2012] EHHC 
1946 (QB). See also the recent Australian case of Mickle v Farley [2013] NSWDC 295 (Farley, a 
student, was ordered to pay Mickle, his teacher, A$105,000 in damages for tweets sent to his 
followers) judgment accessible via http://www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au/action/pjudg?jgmtid=169992; In 
the USA, a Nevada court recently ordered the founder of a ‘revenge porn’ site to pay US$250,000 in 
damages for defamatory tweets stating that plaintiff was a pedophile who possessed child 
pornography: D, Lee, ‘Revenge porn’ site owner Hunter Moore sued for defamation, 11th March 2013, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-21740386 accessed 30th April 2014. 
84 See generally, P. Landau, The antisocial network: why Facebook abuse is a matter for employers, 
The Guardian, 1st May 2012 http://www.theguardian.com/money/work-
blog/2012/may/01/antisocial-network-facebook-abuse-employers accessed 30th April 2014; There 
have also been a number of instances involving, in particular, professional football players, who have 
been subject to disciplinary action by their club and the Football Association following the use of 
social media. For example, see generally: T. Lowles, Professional Footballers and Twitter: A match 
made in (tabloid) heaven, http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/01/16/professional-footballers-and-
twitter-a-match-made-in-tabloid-heaven-tim-lowles/#more-24668 accessed 30th April 2014; P. Coe, 
Social Media ‘faux pas’: there’s only one ‘tweeting’ winner, 
http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/11/06/social-media-faux-pas-theres-only-one-tweeting-winner-
peter-coe/#more-28332 accessed 1st December 2014 
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maybe shared with a select few, have now become formalised and permanent85. 
Social media’s embodiment of the extension of man theory, and its transcendence of 
a physical filtration system, has meant that these actions and expressions are, in the 
click of mouse, or the flick of a finger, publicised for the world to see. They enter the 
“public domain, with the potential for long-lasting and far reaching-
consequences”86.  
 
The remainder of this section will illustrate the social media ‘paradox’ by considering 
some of the current issues regarding the use of social media and how these conflict 
with the notion of a purer form of freedom of expression. These clearly give rise to 
concerns regarding, for example, individuals’ rights to privacy and reputation and 
their protection from harassment, bullying and threatening or abusive behaviour. 
Consequently, they set the scene for the final section, which looks at how some of 
these issues, in the context of criminal prosecutions, have been translated into 
litigation, and how the law, which was not drafted and devised with social media in 
mind, is coping. 
 
Speaker control: Snapchat and Twitter 
A concern with social media that has gained significant traction during 2013 and 
2014 is the notion of ‘speaker control’.  
 
For instance, in May 2014 it was announced that Snapchat had settled with the US 
Federal Trade Commission for misleading its users over data collection, and failing 
to inform them that their photos could be saved, thus raising concerns over the 
permanency of pictures taken using its mobile phone application. Snapchat markets 
it’s platform on the basis that the pictures, and any associated line of text applied to 
the picture, that are shared between users are transitory, as they ‘self-destruct’ after a 
predetermined (by the sender) number of seconds87. However, by taking a 
                                                            
85 Van Dijck (n 5), 6-7 
86 Ibid. See also: Rowbottom (n 25), 366-377; The case of the then 17-year-old Paris Brown who stood 
down as Youth Police and Crime Commissioner over tweets she made when she was 14 to 16 years-old 
V. Dodd, Youth crime commissioner Paris Brown stands down over Twitter row, The Guardian, 9th 
April 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/apr/09/paris-brown-stands-down-twitter 
accessed 1st May 2014 
87 At the time of writing Yahoo purchased a rival ‘self-destructing’ mobile messaging application called 
Blink, in order to acquire the application’s developers to compete with platforms such as Snapchat: 
15 
 
screenshot of the picture, recipients are able to save the image and text permanently, 
with the potential to distribute it elsewhere via other social media platforms. There 
are also third-party applications available, such as Snapsaved, SnapHack and 
SnapBox, which enable the recipient to surreptitiously save photos they have 
received via Snapchat88. These issues materialised in October 2014, when 
www.snapsaved.com, a third-party ‘add-on’ site used to ‘store’ Snapchat pictures, 
was hacked. Consequently, pictures stored by the application were made available 
online. As well as explicit pictures of celebrities, such as Matt Smith, Rhianna, and 
Jennifer Lawrence, children were also affected, raising concerns over the use of the 
pictures within child pornography. This highlights the vulnerability of applications 
such as Snapchat, that can be infiltrated by other, prohibited, add-on applications, 
despite the company’s best efforts to remove them from the internet. Thus, in this 
instance, although Snapchat’s servers were not breached, snapsaved’s were89. This 
follows 4.6 million Snapchat accounts being hacked in January 2014. Usernames and 
phone numbers were downloaded and made available online via a website called 
SnapchatDB90. 
 
A key feature of Twitter is that user A can ‘re-tweet’ user B’s ‘tweet’ to user A’s 
‘followers’. By virtue of user A’s re-tweet, user B’s post will be seen by a far wider 
audience than their group of followers. This process can continue to be extrapolated 
out. Consequently, a tweet to a relatively small group of individuals could end up 
being seen by a very large number of people. Incidentally, popular tweets and re-
tweets can be categorised by Twitter as ‘trending’, meaning that popular ‘discussions’ 
appear on a trending list for all Twitter users to access.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Yahoo buys self-destructing mobile messaging app Blink, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
27403813 accessed 16th May 2014 
88 See generally: Snapchat settles with US regulators for deceiving users, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-27335255; M. Himsworth, Snapchat Secrets: overshare and 
risks moving to new levels, http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/05/13/snapchat-secrets-overshare-
and-risks-moving-to-new-levels-matt-himsworth/ both accessed 13th May 2014 
89 Snapchat Hackers Post Explicit Images Online, 11th October 2014, 
http://news.sky.com/story/1351147/snapchat-hackers-post-explicit-images-online; C. Arthur, Third-
party Snapchat Site claims photos were hacked from server, The Guardian, 13th October 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/oct/13/third-party-snapchat-site-claims-says-pics-
were-hacked-from-server, both accessed 28th October 2014 
90 Snapchat hack affects 4.6 millions users, 2nd January 2014, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-25572661, accessed 28th October 2014 
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Speaker control, in the context of Twitter and re-tweeting, or Snapchat and taking a 
screenshot of pictures, illustrates the paradoxical nature of social media. The 
instantaneous process of tweeting, or taking a picture and possibly adding a line of 
text, facilitates freedom of expression in its purest form. It is often unfiltered and, in 
the case of Twitter, by virtue of re-tweeting and trending, enables individuals to 
express themselves to a very wide audience. To the contrary, the re-tweeted audience 
or the recipients, via another social media platform of a surreptitiously saved 
Snapchat, may not be selected by them. They have no control over who sees their 
post or picture. Therefore, their freedom to express themselves is compromised by a 
lack of choice over their audience.   
 
Cyber-bullying (trolling) and ‘revenge porn’ 
In 2014 the National Society for the Protection of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) 
published a report on ‘The experiences of 11-16 year olds on social networking 
sites’91. The research found that 28% of children with a social media profile 
experienced something that has upset them in the last year92. These experiences 
included, inter alia: cyber-stalking (12%); being subjected to aggressive or offensive 
language (18%); receiving sexually explicit pictures (12%); being asked to provide 
personal or private information (8%)93. The greatest proportion of the group (37%) 
had experienced ‘trolling’94, defined by the report’s authors as: “any unkind, 
sarcastic or negative comments or rumours circulated online”95. These statistics 
mirror Childline’s review of 2012/201396, which found that there had been an 87% 
increase in young people contacting the charity for counselling about online bullying. 
This equates to 4,500 young people accessing advice and support about being bullied 
via social media platforms, chat rooms, online gaming sites, or via their mobile 
                                                            
91 C. Lilley, R. Ball, H. Vernon, The experiences of 11-16 year olds on social networking sites, NSPCC, 
2014 available via http://www.nspcc.org.uk/Inform/resourcesforprofessionals/onlinesafety/11-16-
social-networking-report_wdf101574.pdf . This follows previous research by the Society on younger 
children’s use of social media: C. Lilley and R. Ball, Younger children and social networking sites: a 
blind spot, NSPCC, 2013 available via 
http://www.nspcc.org.uk/Inform/resourcesforprofessionals/onlinesafety/younger-children-
report_wdf99929.pdf  
92 Ibid. 12 
93 Lilley et al (n 91), 13 
94 Ibid. 
95 Lilley et al (n 91) 
96 Childline, What’s Affecting Children in 2013: Can I tell you something? NSPCC, 2013 available via 
http://www.nspcc.org.uk/news-and-views/media-centre/press-releases/2014/childline-
report/childline-report_can-i-tell-you-something_wdf100354.pdf  
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phones97. A further report by Sky News makes it clear that online abuse is increasing 
and that it is not only suffered, but also perpetrated, by children. Over the last three 
years 1,932 children have been subject to investigation regarding allegations of 
online abuse, offensive messages and online bullying. Of that number 1,203 were, 
either, charged with a criminal offence, fined, cautioned or warned verbally98. 
 
In March 2014 the House of Commons Culture Media and Sport Committee 
published its report on online safety99, drawing on evidence, based on the statistics 
above, from the NSPCC, Childline and BeatBullying.org100.  The report makes 
reference to the range of legislation that currently applies to communications sent via 
social media, pursuant to which criminal offences can exist. These include: 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997; Malicious Communications Act 1988; 
Communications Act 2003; Offences Against the Person Act 1861; Computer Misuse 
Act 1990; Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994; Sexual Offences Act 2003101. 
In addition, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) has published Interim 
Guidelines for prosecutors when considering cases involving communications via 
social media102. The most commonly engaged provision has been section 127(1)(a) of 
the Communications Act 2003, which is dealt with in more detail in section 5 below. 
 
Although the report makes a number of recommendations, perhaps the most 
pertinent is the recognition that the raft of legislation that is currently being applied 
to deal with issues such as trolling is simply not fit for purpose, as they were not 
drafted for the social media era. This is illustrated by there being no specific criminal 
                                                            
97 Ibid. 40 
98 Of the 19,279 adults investigated over that period, 11,292 were subject to some of form of criminal 
action. According to responses from thirty-four of the UK’s fifty-one police forces, 6,919 people were 
investigated in 2011/12 under section 127(1)(a) of the Communications Act 2003, including 744 
children. In 2012/13, 6,974 cases were investigated, including 578 under-18s. After the first nine 
months of 2013/14, those figures were already at 7,318 and 610 respectively. See T. Cheshire, Online 
Abuse: Police Deal With Thousands Of Kids, Sky News, 29th May 2014 
http://news.sky.com/story/1271004/online-abuse-police-deal-with-thousands-of-kids accessed 29th 
May 2014 
99 Culture, Media and Sport Committee – Sixth Report Online Safety, 13th March 2014 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmcumeds/729/72902.htm accessed 
20th May 2014 
100 Ibid. [88]-[92] 
101 Culture, Media and Sport Committee – Sixth Report Online Safety (n 99), [93]-[94]  
102 CPS, Guidelines on prosecuting cases involving communications sent via social media, 19th 
December 2012 available via 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/communications_sent_via_social_media/  
18 
 
offence in the UK for cyber-bullying, despite the statistics cited above103. In addition 
to the Committee’s recommendation for new, consolidating legislation, it also asks 
for the status of both offline and online bullying to be clarified, along with guidance 
as to the interpretation of existing laws104. This seems to have been, at least partly, 
heard by the Government as, in October 2014, Chris Grayling, the Justice Minister, 
announced that the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill105 would amend the offence of 
‘sending a letter, electronic communication or article of any description’ which 
conveys a threat or abuse, pursuant to section 1 of the Malicious Communications 
Act106, to a triable either way offence, with a maximum sentence of two years 
imprisonment107. 
 
‘Revenge porn’ has given rise to concerns, both in the UK108 and in the USA109, over 
social media’s impact on user’s rights to privacy and reputation, and their protection 
from harassment and offences against the person. Essentially, it involves individuals 
uploading sexually explicit content of their ex-partners without permission. This 
content is made available via specific websites that link to the respective subjects’ 
social media networks, enabling subjects’ ‘friends’ or ‘followers’ to view the pictures.  
 
At the time of writing, proposed amendments to the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill 
will make revenge porn a specific offence, carrying a maximum sentence of two years 
imprisonment. The offence will cover the sharing of images, both online and offline. 
This means that images posted to social networking sites, as well as those distributed 
by text message, email or in hard copy will be captured. Photographs or films 
showing people engaged in sexual activity, or depicted in a sexual way, or with their 
                                                            
103 Lilley et al (n 91), [96]-[97] 
104 Ibid. [97]; Conclusions and Recommendations [24] 
105 At the time of writing the Bill is at the Report stage. It enters the third Reading on the 10th of 
November 2014 
106 Internet trolls to face 2 years in prison, 20th October 2014, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/internet-trolls-to-face-2-years-in-prison; Internet trolls face 
up to two years in jail under new laws, 19th October 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
29678989, both accessed 28th October 2014 
107 Pursuant to s1(4) the current maximum custodial sentence is six months imprisonment. 
108 At the time of writing, 149 allegations of revenge porn have been made in the past two and a half 
years: House of Lords agree to make revenge porn a criminal offence, 20th October 2014, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-29697600 accessed 28th October 2014 
109 G. Dawson, Revenge Porn is increasing in the UK, say charities, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/26851276 accessed 13th May 2014; D. Lee, ‘Revenge porn’ site 
owner Hunter Moore sued for defamation, 11th March 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
21740386 accessed 30th April 2014.  
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genitals exposed, where what is shown would not usually be seen in public, will fall 
within its ambit110. The change in the law follows campaigning by UK charities for 
legislation to be introduced that mirrors the USA111 were, according to the National 
Conference of State Legislatures, Bills criminalising revenge porn have been 
introduced, or are pending, in twenty-seven states, with legislation already enacted 
in Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Maryland, Utah, Virginia and Wisconsin112. 
 
However, as the law currently stands revenge porn could, depending on the 
circumstances, potentially give rise to offences pursuant to, inter alia, the Protection 
from Harassment Act 1997, the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, Malicious 
Communications Act 1988 and the Communications Act 2003. Civil litigation could 
also ensue for defamation113, breach of copyright114 or misuse of private information 
claims.  
 
The right to be forgotten 
In Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario 
Costeja González115 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that 
search engine operators are responsible for the processing of personal data 
appearing on web pages published by third parties. Consequently, individuals whose 
personal information appears pursuant to a search may request that search engines, 
such as Google or Yahoo, remove the links to the information, even though the initial 
publication of the information may have been lawful116. If the information is 
“inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant”, it must be erased117. The individual, 
subject to the data, is not required to demonstrate any prejudice emanating from the 
                                                            
110 New law to tackle revenge porn, 12th October 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-
law-to-tackle-revenge-porn accessed 28th October 2014 
111 For an example from the USA see G. Dawson, Revenge Porn is increasing in the UK, say charities, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/26851276 accessed 13th May 2014; D. Lee, ‘Revenge porn’ site 
owner Hunter Moore sued for defamation, 11th March 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
21740386 accessed 30th April 2014.  
112 http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/state-revenge-
porn-legislation.aspx accessed 21st May 2014 
113 For an example from the USA see G. Dawson, Revenge Porn is increasing in the UK, say charities, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/26851276 accessed 13th May 2014; D. Lee, ‘Revenge porn’ site 
owner Hunter Moore sued for defamation, 11th March 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
21740386 accessed 30th April 2014. 
114 If an intimate image has been taken as a ‘selfie’, the picture’s copyright belongs to the ‘taker’ 
115 [2014] EUECJ C-131/12 
116 Ibid. [89] 
117 Google Spain SL (n 115), [94] 
20 
 
available information118. This newly recognised right to be forgotten overrides the 
economic interests of search engines, and the general interest in freedom of 
information119 unless it appears that, for particular reasons, such as the role played 
by the individual subject to the data, in public life, that the interference with their 
right to be forgotten is justified by the preponderant interest of the general public in 
having, on account of its inclusion in the list of results, access to the information in 
question120. 
 
The potential impact of this judgment, and the right to be forgotten, once again 
demonstrates social media’s paradoxical nature vis-à-vis the ‘dangers’ of the 
permanency of what is often instantaneous and unfiltered expression made via social 
media. For example, recent research carried out by the Chartered Institute of 
Personnel and Development found that two out of five employers look at candidates’ 
online activity or social media profiles to inform their recruitment decisions121. Thus, 
it seems that employers frequently base their decision on whether to interview or 
employ candidates on comments or pictures that were potentially posted or uploaded 
within a different context or at a different point in the candidate’s life.  The case of 
Paris Brown is a particularly good illustration. Brown was, for six days, the UK’s first 
Youth Police and Crime Commissioner. However, the then 17-year-old stood down 
over comments she had posted on Twitter when she was aged 14-16, that could have 
been interpreted as being homophobic and racist. Brown gave a statement at the 
time of her resignation, stating that she had “fallen into a trap of behaving with 
bravado on social networking sites”, but she denied she held homophobic and racist 
views. Despite Ann Barnes, Kent’s adult Police and Youth Crime Commissioner, 
opining that: “…many people today would not have the jobs they are in if their 
thoughts in their teenage years were scrutinised”122 a Google search for ‘Paris 
                                                            
118 Ibid. [96] 
119 Google Spain SL (n 115), [91], [99] 
120 Ibid. [99] 
121 CIPD, Recruiting and pre-employment vetting in the social media era – CIPD publishes new 
guidance for employers, 9th December 2013 available via http://www.cipd.co.uk/pressoffice/press-
releases/recruiting-pre-employment-vetting-social-media-era-cipd-publishes-new-guidance-
employers-91213.aspx 
122 Google: Who would want the right to be forgotten? 14th May 2014, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-27396981 accessed 21st May 2014. See also: V. Dodd, Youth 
crime commissioner Paris Brown stands down over Twitter row, The Guardian, 9th April 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/apr/09/paris-brown-stands-down-twitter accessed 1st May 
2014 
21 
 
Brown’ still lists, within the top five results, a Daily Mail article from April 2013 
calling her “foul-mouthed” and “offensive”123.  
 
Public disorder 
On a State level, commentators have suggested that social media can manifest itself 
as an uncontrollable danger to society124. This assertion, and the social media 
paradox, can be illustrated by the 2011 riots that began in London as a result of the 
shooting, by police, of Mark Duggan. In R v Blackshaw125 evidence suggested that 
social media was used to co-ordinate riots and public disorder across the UK. 
According to Lord Judge CJ: 
 
“But modern technology has done away with the need for such direct personal 
communication. It can all be done through Facebook or other social media. In other 
words, the abuse of modern technology for criminal purposes extends to and 
includes incitement of very many people by a single step. Indeed it is a sinister 
feature of these cases that modern technology almost certainly assisted rioters in 
other places to organise the rapid movement and congregation of disorderly 
groups in new and unpoliced areas.”126  
 
To the contrary, in the aftermath of the riots, representations were made by 
Blackberry, Facebook and Twitter to the UK Home Affairs Select Committee that, 
during the disturbances, social media was also used for good purposes, for example, 
by innocent people to ensure their friends were safe, and by the police to organise 
their response. In the Select Committee’s opinion it would be ‘actively unhelpful to 
switch off social media during times of widespread and serious disorder’127. 
 
                                                            
123 A. Edwards, Teenage youth crime commissioner who quit over offensive tweets is questioned by 
Special Branch, Mail Online, 20th April 2013 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2312044/Paris-Brown-Foul-mouthed-youth-commissioner-quit-offensive-tweets-questioned-police-
caution.html accessed 21st May 2014 
124 See generally: M. Mueller, Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance (MIT 
Press, 2010); McGoldrick (n 41), 130 
125 [2011] EWCA Crim 2312; McGoldrick (n 41), 130. As McGoldrick notes, there is also evidence that 
social media was used in the Arab Spring to help facilitate democratic revolutions in the Arab World; 
At the time of writing social media had been used to organise an illegal rave on National Trust 
property in Surrey: See J. Loeb, Rave on: party at a beauty spot is too big for police to stop, The 
Times, 26th May 2014, 15 
126 Ibid. at [73]  
127 Policing Large Scale Disorder: Lessons from the Disturbances of August 2011, Sixteenth Report of 
Session 2010-2012, HC 1456-I, 27-30, 30 
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V. DOMESTIC REGULATION OF SOCIAL EXPRESSION: CRIMINAL LAW 
 
Clearly the paradoxical nature of social media has an ability to enable the best and 
worst expression. As a consequence it has become a new breeding ground for legal 
action128. However, as discussed above, unlike the transitory nature of things said in 
passing, or in elation, or anger, or frustration, a 140 character Tweet, or a Facebook 
post, or a picture on Snapchat or Instagram are, predominantly, permanent. In a 
legal terrain, which remains largely uncharted, and is constantly shifting, the 
exponential growth of social media platforms demonstrates our obsession with them, 
and the increasing power they wield. Consequently, the permanency of this 
intersection between communication and technology creates complex challenges for 
the law, and the multitude of stakeholders engaged with social media. The HRC 
Rapporteur recognised the unique nature of the internet, and that regulations or 
restrictions which may be legitimate and proportionate for traditional media are not 
when it comes to new forms of media129. Thus, applying laws designed for an era that 
did not have access to social media, let alone envisage it, have been inappropriate130 
and potentially incompatible with the right to freedom of expression. However, the 
exponential growth of social media, and the pace of change it has brought, has made 
it difficult, if not impossible for the law to adjust adequately, as illustrated by the 
criminal law.  
 
(i)Communications Act 2003 
The provision most commonly engaged in relation to social media is section 127(1)(a) 
of the Communications Act 2003131, which makes it an offence to send: 
 
‘…by means of a public electronic communications network a message or other 
matter that is grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character’. 
 
                                                            
128 J.J. Henderson, The Boundaries of Free Speech in Social Media, in D.R. Stewart (ed), Social Media 
and the Law, (Routledge, 2013), 1 
129 La Rue (n 10),  [27] 
130 McGoldrick (n 41), 129; L. Scaife, The Regulation of Social Media, (2012) 14 E-Commerce Law & 
Policy, 6 
131 Cheshire (n 81); See also: McGoldrick (n 41), 132 citing D. Ormerod, Telecommunications: Sending 
Grossly Offensive Message By Means of a Public Electronic Communications Network (2007) 
Criminal Law Review, Jan, 98-100 
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The offence is committed as soon as the message is sent. It does not matter whether 
it is received by the intended recipient or anybody else132. According to the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) the provision can be used as an alternative offence to such 
crimes as hate crime (including race, religion, disability, homophobic, sexual 
orientation, and transphobic crime), hacking offences, cyber-bullying and cyber-
stalking133. 
 
(a)The meaning of ‘grossly offensive’ 
 
- DPP v Collins 
The leading judgment on what is meant by ‘grossly offensive’ was handed down by 
the House of Lords in DPP v Collins134, in which the respondent had made a series of 
racist telephone calls, and left similar answerphone messages, to the office of his MP. 
In considering whether an offence had been committed pursuant to section 127(1)(a), 
Lord Bingham stated that the standards of an open and just multi-racial society had 
to be taken into account, as well as the context within which the words were said, 
along with all the relevant circumstances. Thus, according to his Lordship: “There 
can be no yardstick of gross offensiveness otherwise than by the application of 
reasonably enlightened, but not perfectionist, contemporary standards to the 
particular message sent in its particular context. The test is whether a message is 
couched in terms liable to cause gross offence to those to whom it relates”135. 
 
Lord Bingham stressed that individuals are entitled to make their views known, and 
to express them strongly. Thus, the appropriate question to be considered by judges 
in determining whether expression is grossly offensive is whether the language used 
is beyond the pale of what is tolerable in our society136. His Lordship recognised that, 
prima facie, section 127(1)(a) does interfere with the right to freedom of expression, 
pursuant to Article 10(1) ECHR. However, its restriction is prescribed by Article 
10(2) which is directed to a legitimate objective: preventing the use of a public 
                                                            
132 DPP v Collins [2006] UKHL 40 per Lord Bingham, [8] 
133 Crown Prosecution Service, Improper use of public electronic communications network - 
Communications Act 2003, section 127, available via 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/communications_offences/ accessed 21st May 2014 
134 [2006] UKHL 40 
135 Ibid. [9]  
136 Crown Prosecution Service (n 133), [12] 
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electronic communications network for attacking the reputations and rights of others 
and, therefore, goes no further than is necessary in a democratic society to achieve 
that end137.  
 
At this point it is worth revisiting the jurisprudence of the ECtHR (and the HRC). 
Article 10(1) has been interpreted to recognise a right for individuals to express 
themselves in way that is offensive, shocking or disturbing.  No mention of this was 
made in Collins. There is a clear disconnect between the Collins’ test of whether the 
message will cause gross offence to whom it relates / whether the language used is 
beyond the pale of what is tolerable in our society and the right to offend, shock or 
disturb. It is submitted that in exercising this right it is likely that the individual may 
‘go beyond the pale’ of what is tolerable within society at that given time.  
 
Social media exacerbates the apparent tension between freedom of expression and 
this test. As discussed above, individuals express themselves instantaneously, often 
without filter. Very often this may be communicated to their ‘society’ or ‘community’, 
who they know will not take offence. However, as an ‘extension of man’, little thought 
is given to the fact that a ‘wider society’ may see it, or to its potential permanency. 
The following cases illustrate this point, and the difficulty in applying the test 
consistently in these circumstances. 
 
- Daniel Thomas, Tom Daley and Twitter  
In July 2012 Daniel Thomas, a Welsh Premier League footballer, posted the 
following homophobic tweet on Twitter relating to Olympic divers Tom Daley and 
Peter Waterfield: ‘If there is any consolation for finishing fourth at least Daley and 
Waterfield can go and bum each other #teamHIV.’ Although, initially, this was only 
tweeted to Thomas’ followers, it was re-tweeted more widely. Thomas was arrested 
and the matter referred to the CPS to consider whether he should be charged with a 
criminal offence. Due to the publicity the case courted, the then DPP, Kier Starmer 
QC, issued a statement on social media communications138. The DPP did not doubt 
that Thomas’ message was offensive, and would be regarded as such by reasonable 
                                                            
137 Ibid. [14] 
138 DPP statement on Tom Daley case and social media prosecutions, 20th September 2012, available 
via http://blog.cps.gov.uk/2012/09/dpp-statement-on-tom-daley-case-and-social-media-
prosecutions.html accessed 22nd May 2014 
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members of society. However, the question was whether the message was so ‘grossly 
offensive’ as to be criminal and, if so, whether a prosecution was required in the 
public interest139. The DPP recognised that the distinction between offensive and 
grossly offensive is critical, but is not easy to make. Accordingly, the context and 
circumstances of the communication are relevant as is ECtHR’s statement in 
Handyside140.  
 
In relation to Thomas’ case, in the DPP’s opinion, the context and circumstances 
were particularly pertinent, for the following reasons: (a) However misguided, the 
message was intended to be humorous; (b) Although naïve, there was no intention 
for the message to go beyond Thomas’ followers, who were mainly friends and 
family; (c) Thomas took reasonably swift action to remove the message; (d) Thomas 
expressed remorse and was, for a period, suspended by his football club141; (e) 
Neither Daley or Waterfield were the intended recipients of the message and neither 
knew of its existence until it was brought to their attention following reports in the 
media; (f) In essence, this was a one-off offensive Twitter message, intended for 
family and friends, which made its way into the public domain. It was not intended 
to reach Daley and Waterfield, it was not part of a campaign, it was not intended to 
incite others and Thomas removed it reasonably swiftly and has expressed 
remorse142. Consequently, the prosecutor decided that it was not so grossly offensive 
that criminal charges needed to be brought. 
 
- DPP v Woods143 and other cases 
Nineteen-year-old Matthew Woods was sentenced to twelve weeks imprisonment for 
Facebook ‘jokes’, relating to April Jones and Madeleine McCann, he made whilst 
drinking alcohol with friends. Public reaction led to him being arrested for his own 
safety and he subsequently pleaded guilty to the section 127(1)(a) offence. According 
                                                            
139 Ibid. 
140 DPP statement (n 138) 
141 Thomas was suspended for one match and ordered to pay a £500 fine: Tom Daley tweet: Port 
Talbot footballer Daniel Thomas fined, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-south-west-wales-
20512439 accessed 22nd May 2014. A number of footballers have been suspended or fined by their 
clubs and/or the Football Association in relation to their use of social media. See generally: T. Lowles, 
Professional Footballers and Twitter: A match made in (tabloid) heaven, 
http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/01/16/professional-footballers-and-twitter-a-match-made-in-
tabloid-heaven-tim-lowles/#more-24668 accessed 30th April 2014. 
 
142 DPP statement (n 138) 
143 Unrep. October 2012 (MC) 
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to the prosecutor: “He started this idea when he was at a friend’s house, saw a joke 
on Sickipedia and changed it slightly”144. By virtue of being posted on his Facebook 
page, the joke became available to a large number of people. 
 
Woods’ case was heard in the context of a number of other incidents involving 
offensive posts made on social media.  For instance, Liam Stacey was jailed for fifty-
six days after he tweeted ‘LOL’ (laugh out loud) in response to the footballer Fabrice 
Muamba’s on-pitch collapse, and subsequent racist and offensive he made comments 
after other people who criticised him145. In September 2012 Neil Swinburne was 
arrested over an offensive Facebook tribute page set-up following the fatal shootings 
of two female police officers in Manchester146.  
 
The decision to prosecute Woods seems to conflict with the DPP’s statement relating 
to the treatment of Thomas, in particular the necessity to take into account the 
context and circumstances within which the communication was made (he was 19-
years-old at the time, he was with friends, he had consumed alcohol, a variation of 
the joke was already in the public domain on a well-known website) and the ECtHR’s 
statement in Handyside. It is submitted that there is a clear difference between, on 
the one hand, Thomas and Woods ‘type’ communications that are offensive, 
immature and thoughtless but were one off, unfiltered and instantaneous 
manifestations of a thought, compared with, on the other hand, the Stacey and 
Swinburne ‘type’ communications, that were either sustained or, in the case of 
setting up a Facebook page, pre-meditated and thought-out.  
 
(b)Of an indecent, obscene or menacing character 
The section 127(1)(a) offence can also be committed when the communication is of 
an indecent, obscene or menacing character. Chambers v DPP147 concerned a tweet 
alleged to be of ‘menacing character’. 
 
 
 
                                                            
144 Scaife (n 25), 5 
145 Ibid.  
146 McGoldrick (n 41), 133 
147 [2012] EWHC 2157 
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- The ‘Twitter joke trial’ 
Paul Chambers was prosecuted, and convicted for sending the following tweet, 
which, at first instance, was held to be of a ‘menacing character’: ‘Crap! Robin Hood 
airport is closed. You’ve got a week and a bit to get your s**t together otherwise I’m 
blowing the airport sky high!!’  
 
Chambers’ appeal to the Crown Court was dismissed on the basis that the tweet’s 
content was menacing per se, and that an ordinary person seeing the tweet would see 
it in that way and be alarmed148. This is despite Robin Hood Airport classifying 
Chambers’ ‘threat’ as ‘non-credible’149, and that it was ‘nothing other than a foolish 
comment posted as a joke for only his close friends to see’150. Chambers 
subsequently appealed to the Divisional Court of the High Court, which took an 
entirely contrary view to the Crown Court, and allowed the appeal on the basis that 
the tweet did not constitute, or include, a message of a menacing character151. 
According to Lord Judge CJ:  
 
“…if the person or persons who receive or read it, or may reasonably be expected to 
receive, or read it, would brush it aside as a silly joke, or a joke in bad taste, or 
empty bombastic or ridiculous banter, then it would be a contradiction in terms to 
describe it as a message of a menacing character. In short, a message which does 
not create fear or apprehension in those to whom it is communicated, or who may 
reasonably be expected to see it, falls outside this provision, for the very simple 
reason that the message lacks menace”152. 
 
Although his Lordship was clear that the 2003 Act was not drafted to interfere with 
freedom of expression, pursuant to Article 10(1)153 it is submitted that there is 
potential for prosecutions brought under section 127(1)(a) to face resistance from 
Article 10(1) ECHR, on the basis that the right to freedom of expression incorporates 
the right to offend, shock or disturb. Lord Judge CJ’s judgment does not assimilate 
easily with the world of social media where, as can be seen above with regard to, for 
                                                            
148 Ibid. [17] citing Her Honour Judge Davies 
149 Chambers (n 147), [13] 
150 Ibid. [15] 
151 Chambers (n 147), [38] per Lord Judge CJ 
152 Ibid. [30] 
153 Chambers (n 147), [28] 
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instance, ‘speaker control’ issues, there is no such thing as an audience who may be 
reasonably expected to receive or read a post, picture or tweet that is sent 
spontaneously, without filter. Thoughts, feelings and frustrated rants or 
inappropriate jokes can be sent, initially, to a very small group and then re-
disseminated to a potentially unlimited audience. Although the initial ‘group’ may 
not see the message as being indecent, or obscene or menacing, members of a wider 
audience may do. In the context of ‘grossly offensive’ communications, the inability 
for his Lordship’s test to work effectively in the context of social media 
communications is clearly apparent in the inconsistent decisions relating to Matthew 
Woods and Daniel Thomas.   
 
 (ii)Other provisions applied to social media expression 
 
Other criminal law provisions that have been applied to social media expression 
include the Malicious Communications Act 1988, a piece of legislation drafted to deal 
with poison pen letters154. Section 1(1) provides that it is an offence to send to 
another person, inter alia, an electronic communication which conveys (a) (i) a 
message which is indecent or grossly offensive; (ii) a threat; (iii) information which 
is false and known or believed to be false by the sender; or (b) which is, in whole or 
part, of an indecent or grossly offensive nature, if one of the sender’s purposes is to 
cause distress or anxiety to the recipient or any other person the sender intends the 
contents of the message to be communicated to. According to Haralambous and 
Johnson, the Act is unclear as to whether, for example, posts on Facebook constitute 
sending a message to another person155. However, the Act has been applied to some 
digital communications, including social media expression156. Provisions under the 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 may also give rise to criminal liability for social 
media expression amounting to cyber-bullying (trolling) or online harassment. For 
instance, section 1 provides that a person must not pursue a course of conduct157 that 
amounts to harassment (alarming or causing the victim distress158) of another. 
                                                            
154 Law Commission Report on Poison Pen Letters (1985) Law Com. No. 147 
155 N. Haralambous and M. Johnson, Facebook — Friend or Foe? (2010) 174 JPN 469, 470 
156 For example, in 2012 a man received a four month suspended sentence after an online discussion 
about football resulted in him posting a tweet referring to Newcastle United as “Coon Army”: The 
Northern Echo, 28th February 2012 
157 Section 7(3) provides that, in relation to a single person, a course of conduct must involve conduct 
on at least 2 occasions 
158 Section 7(2); DPP v Ramsdale [2001] EWHC Admin 106 
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Section 4 provides for the aggravated offence of putting the victim in fear of violence 
on at least two occasions. Section 2A159 relates specifically to stalking160 and, by 
virtue of s2A(3), cyber-stalking161.  
 
Section 4A of the Public Order Act 1986 provides that it is an offence for a person to 
use ‘threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or disorderly 
behaviour’162, or display ‘any writing, sign or other visible representation which is 
threatening, abusive or insulting’ which causes ‘that or another person harassment, 
alarm or distress’163. Section 4A(3) excludes from the ambit of the offence situations 
where the defendant and the recipient of the communication were inside a dwelling, 
thus offering some protection for private speech164.  However, according to the 
District Judge in S v Director of Public Prosecutions165 “any person who posts 
material on the Internet puts that material within the public ambit”166. As social 
media embodies the ‘extension of man’ theory individuals can forget that what they 
are expressing is not communicated within a private arena, such as a dwelling. It is 
submitted that, to them, they are still ‘in private’, even though their thoughts and 
feelings can, potentially, be communicated to a very wide audience. Therefore, such 
communications, unless falling precisely within section 4A(3), are within the “public 
ambit”, and are captured by the offence.  
 
The mens rea of the offence provides some protection for social media expression, as 
it requires an intention to cause harassment, alarm or distress. However, the 
requirement that the speech is insulting, and causes distress, is a low threshold167 
that clearly does not accord with the right to offend, shock or disturb. For instance, 
‘insulting banter’ between individuals, that may have once remained within private 
arenas, such as a house or a pub, can now play out over social media, exposing 
individuals to potential prosecution. This concern is reflected by the judgment in Ajit 
                                                            
159 Inserted by section 111 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 
160 Section 4A provides for the aggravated offence of stalking involving fear of violence or serious 
alarm or distress 
161 See generally: J. Agate and J. Ledward, Social media: how the net is closing in on cyber bullies, 
Ent. L.R. 2013, 24(8), 263-268; N. MacEwan, The new stalking offences in English law: will they 
provide effective protection from cyberstalking? Crim. L.R. 2012, 10, 767-781 
162 Section 4A(1)(a) 
163 Section 4A(1)(b) 
164 Rowbottom (n 25), 360 
165 [2008] EWHC 438 (Admin) 
166 Ibid. [4] per Lord Justice Maurice Kay citing the District Judge 
167 Rowbottom (n 25), 360 
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Singh Dehal v Crown Prosecution Service168 where it was held that a prosecution 
under section 4A would not comply with Article 10 unless it was brought to maintain 
public order169. 
 
Section 5 of the Act is broader in application as it does not require the 
communication to actually cause harassment, alarm or distress170, or that the 
communicator intends this. However, section 5(1)(b) requires that the words or 
behaviour ‘be within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused 
harassment, alarm or distress thereby’. It remains unclear whether social media 
communications are within the ambit of section 5(1)(b), or if it applies exclusively to 
physical proximity. For example, Maurice Kay LJ’s judgment in S v DPP implies that 
the provision does not apply to websites as, according to his Lordship, the omission 
in section 4A of the ‘within sight or hearing’ requirement “was conditioned by an 
appreciation of the problems created by the posting of offensive material on 
websites”171. However, as Rowbottom suggests, this case does not provide a definitive 
statement of the law, as it relates to whether, for the purposes of section 4A, the 
victim must actually see the material on the internet, or if it is sufficient to be made 
aware of its existence or shown a copy by a third party at a later date172. Other 
commentators are of the opinion that the section does apply to expression on the 
internet173. 
 
If social media expression does come within the province of the provision it creates 
clear tension with the right to freedom of expression. For example, a person may post 
an abusive or insulting message on Facebook or a tweet to their followers knowing 
that this ‘community’ would not be caused harassment, alarm or distress. However, 
as this is a ‘conduct crime’, meaning that there is no requirement that harm is 
actually caused to an individual for a successful prosecution to ensue, if that message 
or tweet is disseminated, beyond their control, to a wider audience, an offence could 
                                                            
168 [2005] EWHC 2154 (Admin) 
169 Ibid. [12] 
170 Norwood v DPP [2003] EWHC 1564 
171 S v DPP, [12] and [15] per Maurice Kay LJ 
172 Rowbottom (n 25), 361  
173 N. Haralambous and N. Geach, Regulating Harassment: Is the Law Fit for the Social Networking 
Age? (2009) 73(3) Journal of Criminal Law 241, 256-256 
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be committed so long as it is seen by somebody likely to be caused harassment, alarm 
or distress.  
 
Freedom of expression and the DPP’s Interim Guidelines 
The apparent ‘tension’ between the array of criminal law provisions that could be 
engaged in relation to social media communications and freedom of expression, and 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and HRC, did not go unnoticed by the previous DPP, 
when he made his statement on social media prosecutions. The statement recognised 
that the context within which real-time social media expression and interaction 
occurs is different to that within which other communication and expression takes 
place. Consequently, in cases involving social media, the CPS has to balance ‘the 
fundamental right of free speech and the need to prosecute serious wrongdoing on 
a case by case basis’174. The DPP recognised that the CPS was making very difficult 
judgment calls on whether or not to prosecute, as social media expression was (and 
still is) largely uncharted terrain: 
 
‘In some cases it is clear that a criminal prosecution is the appropriate response to 
conduct which is complained about, for example where there is a sustained 
campaign of harassment of an individual, where court orders are flouted or where 
grossly offensive or threatening remarks are made and maintained. But in many 
other cases a criminal prosecution will not be the appropriate response. If the 
fundamental right to free speech is to be respected, the threshold for criminal 
prosecution has to be a high one and a prosecution has to be required in the public 
interest’175. 
 
The DPP announced in the statement that he intended to issue Interim Guidelines 
for prosecutors dealing social media cases. He also stated that: ‘[s]ocial media is a 
new and emerging phenomenon raising difficult issues of principle…the time has 
come for an informed debate about the boundaries of free speech in an age of social 
media’176.  
 
                                                            
174 DPP statement (n 138) 
175 Ibid. 
176 DPP statement (n 138) 
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The Interim Guidelines177 distinguish between two categories of cases. Category one 
includes communications: which may constitute credible threats of violence to 
persons or damage to property; which specifically target one or more individuals; 
which may amount to a breach of a court order178. This category of communications 
must be prosecuted robustly179. Category two incorporates communications that may 
be considered grossly offensive, indecent, obscene or false180. Such communications 
will be subject to a high threshold, and in many cases a prosecution is unlikely to be 
in the public interest181, although they are not precluded from prosecution.  
 
According to the Guidelines the rationale behind categorising communications in 
this way is due to the potential ‘chilling effect’ prosecutions relating to social media 
expression may have on freedom of expression182. Thus, the Guidelines were drafted 
with the intention of ensuring compliance with Article 10183. This is clearly evidenced 
with respect to the high threshold, as the Guidelines state that the common law and 
applicable legislation must be interpreted consistently with Article 10 as interpreted 
by ECtHR jurisprudence184, including Handyside.  
 
The Guidelines’ common sense approach to social media expression is illustrated 
further in the context of sections 1 and 127(1)(a) of the Malicious Communications 
Act 1988 and Communications Act 2003 respectively, in that it reminds prosecutors 
that what is prohibited under these provisions is the sending of a communication 
that is grossly offensive. Accordingly, a communication has to be more than simply 
offensive to be contrary to the criminal law. Therefore, just because the content 
expressed in the communication is in bad taste, controversial or unpopular, and may 
cause offence to individuals or a specific community, does not, in itself, require the 
engagement of the criminal law185. Furthermore, prosecutors are required to 
consider the context in which real-time social media communications operate, and to 
have regard to the fact that: ‘[a]ccess is ubiquitous and instantaneous. Banter, jokes 
                                                            
177 CPS Guidelines (n 102) 
178 Ibid. [12] 
179 CPS Guidelines (n 102), [13] 
180 Ibid. [12] 
181 CPS Guidelines (n 102), [13] 
182 Ibid. [29] 
183 CPS Guidelines (n 102), [30]-[36]; See also McGoldrick (n 41), 136 
184 Ibid. [30]-[33] 
185 CPS Guidelines (n 102), [34] 
33 
 
and offensive comments are commonplace and often spontaneous. Communications 
intended for a few may reach millions’186. Consequently, prosecutors should only 
proceed with prosecutions pursuant to these provisions where, on the facts and 
merits of the individual case a prosecution is both necessary and proportionate in 
accordance with Article 10187, and they are satisfied that the communication in 
question is more than: offensive, shocking or disturbing; or satirical, iconoclastic or 
rude comment; or the expression of unpopular or unfashionable opinion about 
serious or trivial matters, or banter or humour, even if distasteful to some or painful 
to those subjected to it. If satisfied, prosecutors should go on to consider whether a 
prosecution is required in the public interest188. Finally, the age and maturity of 
suspects should be given significant weight, as children may not appreciate the 
potential harm and seriousness of their communications. In these instances, a 
prosecution will rarely be in the public interest189. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The use of different criminal law legislation, designed and drafted for a time before 
the advent of social media, effectively re-contextualises the application of these 
provisions. Instead of applying to an environment where a parent, teacher or police 
officer could provide a warning to an individual using, for instance, threatening or 
abusive language, they now operate in a world where the individual who posts a 
tweet, or shares a Snapchat or Instagram image, will have a very different idea as to 
their responsibilities and, by virtue of the remoteness of the online world, the 
consequences that may ensue from their actions. As an extension of man, the use of 
social media erodes individuals’ perceptions of private and public boundaries, 
                                                            
186 Ibid. [35] 
187 CPS Guidelines (n 102), [38]-[39]; A prosecution is unlikely to be both necessary and 
proportionate where: (a) The suspect has swiftly taken action to remove the communication or 
expressed genuine remorse; (b) Swift and effective action has been taken by others for example, 
service providers, to remove the communication in question or otherwise block access to it; (c) The 
communication was not intended for a wide audience, nor was that the obvious consequence of 
sending the communication; particularly where the intended audience did not include the victim or 
target of the communication in question; or (d) The content of the communication did not obviously 
go beyond what could conceivably be tolerable or acceptable in an open and diverse society which 
upholds and respects freedom of expression. 
188 Ibid. [36] 
189 CPS Guidelines (n 102), [41] 
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meaning the public arena is effectively blurred with their ‘private community’. 
Clearly, had the Guidelines been in place at the time the prosecutions dealt with 
above were initiated, a more contextualised and consistent approach, in line with 
Article 10 and its jurisprudence, may have been applied. It is submitted that the 
Guidelines can bring a semblance of order to the multitude of legislation and 
common law jurisprudence that can be applied to social media communications. 
They effectively mitigate against, what was (and, to an extent, still is), a ‘square peg 
round hole’ regime. Thus, prima facie the Guidelines, and the common sense and 
contextualised approach they advocate, accord with ECHR, ECtHR, ICCPR and HRC 
principles of freedom of expression. Furthermore, it is submitted that these 
Guidelines, in theory, have the potential to provide the equilibrium that is needed to 
both protect individuals and to facilitate the notion of a purer form of expression, 
exercised through the use of social media.  
 
However, the overall impact of the criminalisation of expression remains to be seen. 
A recent Sky News investigation provides some insight into the Guidelines potential 
long-term effect. According to the report almost 23,000 people have been 
investigated by police in the last three years relating to social media abuse, offensive 
Twitter messages and online bullying, equating to twenty cases per day; a 5% 
increase on 2011. Despite the higher threshold set by the Guidelines, and the 
requirement for prosecutors to consider the context in which the communication was 
made, including giving weight to the age of the communicator190, these figures look 
as though they will continue to rise. Prosecutions pursuant to section 127(1)(a) of the 
Communications Act 2003 continue to be the preferred option for the CPS, as 
evidenced by the following statistics, provided by thirty-four of the UK’s fifty-one 
police forces: In 2011/12 919 people were investigated. This rose to 6,974 in 2012/13 
and, in the first nine months of 2013/14, 7,318 people had already been subject to 
investigation191. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
190 Cheshire (n 81): It is clear from the report that children are increasingly been prosecuted for 
offences stemming from the use of social media.  
191 Ibid. 
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